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This paper is based on my discussion comments of"Incentives versus Standards: Properties of Accounting 
Income in Four East Asian Countries" by Ray Ball, Ashok Robin and Joanna Wu which was presented at 
the October, 2002 Journal of Accounting and Economics conference. I would like to thank Doug Skinner 
and Ross Watts for comments. I am particularly indebted to my colleague Christian Leuz for numerous 
informative discussions about this topic. All misdeeds are, of course, my own. 
Abstract 
Ball Robin and Wu (2003) investigate the relationship between accounting standards and the structure of 
other institutions on the attributes of the financial reporting system. They find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that beyond accounting standards, the structure of other institutions, such as incentives of 
preparers and auditors, enforcement mechanisms and ownership structure affects the outcome of the 
fmancial reporting system. Howev er, intetpretation of the evidence with respect to the notion of quality of 
the financial reporting system and the quality of accounting standards that the authors introduce is 
problematic. 
JEL Classification: D82; F02; G 15; M41; 053 
Keywords: Financial Reporting Quality; International Accounting Standards; Cross-Country 
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1. Introduction 
The major contention of Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) (henceforth BRW) is that 
accounting standards alone do not determine the quality of financial statements and 
fmancial reporting. Beyond accounting standards, incentives of preparers and auditors, 
enforcement mechanisms, ownership structure and other institutional features of the 
economy affect the outcome ofthe financial reporting process. 
BRW contend that the East Asian countries of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand are a good setting for testing the premise that high quality standards are a 
key determinant of financial reporting quality. They argue that these four countries have 
high quality standards (heavily UK, US and lAS influenced) but have institutional 
structures that provide incentives to issue low-quality reports. Hence, they predict that 
the outcome of the overall structure in those countries will lead to low quality financial 
reporting. 
In order to conduct any empirical work toward their stated goal, BRW must 
operationalize the concept of the quality of the financial reporting system. Their measure 
is the timeliness with which economic income is reflected in accounting income, where 
economic income is defined as the common stock return over the fiscal year of a 
company. Within that framework, they further concentrate on the extent to which the 
accounting system recognizes economic losses on a timely basis, i.e., conservatism. 
Thus, the empirical tests generally entail various regression specifications of net income 
on common stock returns. 
The evidence in BRW is not consistent with timely recognition of economic 
income (particularly losses) in the four East Asian countries despite their alleged high 
quality standards. The results indicate that the earnings timeliness of the four East Asian 
countries is more similar to code than common law countries. Hong Kong's financial 
reporting is the most timely of the four East Asian countries, consistent with its market 
orientation, while Thailand's is the least timely, consistent with the influence oftax and 
government codification of standards in that country. The results are consistent with 
incentiv es of preparers and other institutional factors having a first-order effect on the 
outcome of the financial reporting process. 
The authors argue that their results have three interesting implications. First, the 
literature's focus on the "quality" of accounting standards per se is an incomplete and 
potentially misleading classification scheme for determining the quality of a country's 
fmancial reporting. Second, they argue that if a country wants to increase its fmancial 
reporting quality, changing manager and auditor incentives and other institutional 
features is more important than mandating foreign accounting standards. Third, they 
argue that pressure to reduce variation in accounting standards across countries will not 
resolve differences in the quality of financial reporting across countries, unless other 
important features that influence the reporting process are also changed. Moreover, 
adoption of lAS standards by countries with weak incentives and enforcement 
mechanisms will likely lead to damaging the perceived quality ofiAS standards. 
My discussion comments will focus on six issues. I conclude with a summary 
and discussion of future potential work. 
2. Is this an interesting and important question? 
There is little doubt that determining the marginal effects of accounting standards, 
incentives, ownership structure, institutional features of the capital markets and 
enforcement on the quality of financial reporting is an interesting and important issue. 
The general theme of the paper relates to many interesting and important issues. Are 
accounting standards and other institutional features complements or substitutes? Are 
there alternative mechanisms for achieving a particular level of quality in the financial 
reporting system, that is, are there a variety of structures that can result in equiv alent 
outcomes? Which institutional features are most important, which are least important? Is 
it easier for firms to opt out of their country's poor reporting environment to raise outside 
capital if there are high quality standards available than ifthere are only low quality 
standards. Many have now contributed to this general area of inquiry and some of the 
already-published work was influenced by earlier drafts ofBRW. Irrespective of my 
subsequent critiques of their paper, BRW's contribution to this literature is obvious. 
3. Is this a good setting to address the interplay of accounting standards and 
other institutional features? Or, are lAS Standards of high quality? 
A crucial assumption ofBRW's tests is that the lAS standards as adopted by these 
East As ian countries are of "sufficiently" high quality. If they are not of high quality, 
then it is not obvious that the authors can legitimately draw any conclusion about the 
relative power of accounting standards and other institutional features to affect the 
outcome of the fmancial reporting process. The question is whether there must be some 
minimal quality level reached by the accounting standards in order for those standards to 
substitute for certain institutional features. If the standards were of only mediocre 
quality, then we may have learned little about whether standards can substitute for other 
institutional features and impact the quality offmancial reporting. Moreover, it would be 
difficult to conclude that future attempts to homogenize accounting standards around the 
world using lAS will lead to similarly poor outcomes for the financial reporting process 
as seen in these tests on Asia, especially if lAS standards have improv ed or continue to 
improve. As such, the authors must assume some minimum quality threshold was met 
during their sample period in order to draw their conclusions. 
The authors ' stated rationale for why these standards are of high quality relates 
both to the lAS standards themselves as well as to the common law influence on the 
standards adopted in these four East Asian countries. However, a key question is whether 
the accounting standards in these four Asian countries were of high quality during the 
time period of the authors ' tests. Consider the following abbreviated history. The IASC 
was founded in 1973 to set international accounting standards. Starting in 1987, the 
IASC undertook the Comparability/Improvements Project and the resulting standards 
became effective in 1995. This project was undertaken because of a multitude of 
perceived deficiencies in lAS. In July, 1995, the IASC and IOSCO agreed on a list of 
further important issues that needed to be addressed. This "Core Standards Project" led 
to substantial revisions in lAS and those were completed (except for one) by March, 
1999, after the time period of the data for this study (1984-1996). 
Thus, if current or future lAS standards are of higher quality than the quality of 
the lAS standards during the authors' sample period, there is no way to know from the 
evidence in this paper whether the standards have become strong enough to mitigate the 
effect of other institutional features that might lead to lower quality financial reporting. 
Nor can we know from the evidence in BRW, whether accounting standards can become 
strong enough to mitigate the effects of certain institutional features. Thus, it is difficult 
to infer the potential effects of further adoption ofiAS. 
There is some evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that lAS standards 
have improved. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show, albeit in a small sample, that early 
adopters ofiAS from German G AAP received relatively little decrease in bid-ask spreads 
and little increase in volume relative to later lAS adopters from German GAAP. This is 
consistent with l AS standards increasing in quality through time. 
In a letter to the editors, BRW provided information about the early ( 1984- 1991) 
vs. later period ( 1992-1996) and report qualitatively similar findings in that the Asian 
group still looks more like the code-law group than the common-law group in both sub-
periods. However, those tests also show an increasing R2 between the first and second 
period and an increase in the timely recognition of losses in the second sub-period for the 
East Asian countries. The authors did not provide tests on whether the increases are 
significant, but judging from the results, the increase in the timely recognition of losses 
may well be significant. Thus, it appears that a shift in the characteristics of the fmancial 
reporting process was taking place between the first and second sub-period. Whether that 
is due to a shift in lAS standards or whether it was due to shifts in other institutional 
features cannot be determined from this evidence.1 We do know, however, that lAS 
standards were ev olving during this time period. So the question remains, were the 
1 As I explain later, this finding could also have nothing to do with changes in a country's accounting 
standards or institutions. Instead, it could be driven by firms choosing to at least partially opt out of their 
country's accounting and institutional structure by cross-listing in other capital markets or using other 
appropriate mechanisms. 
standards of sufficiently high quality even in the second sub-period? If not, it is difficult 
to draw conclusions from the evidence about the relative power of high-quality standards 
and other institutional features . 
Leuz (2003) examines various liquidity and information asymmetry variables for 
German firms that list on the New Market and who must adopt either lAS or U. S. GAAP 
in order to be listed. The salient feature of this paper is that the institutional structure is 
held reasonably constant because he examines only German firms that adopt U. S. or lAS 
G AAP with no other regulatory change. No differences in information asymmetry or 
liquidity were found between German firms adopting lAS GAAP and those adopting U.S. 
GAAP. The time period of the data for the Leuz study is after the Core Standards project 
for l AS, whereas the BRW data is all from a prior period. Given no observed differences 
in information asymmetry or liquidity between German firms that adopt U.S. or lAS 
GAAP, there are two potential interpretations. One interpretation is that the standards 
had increased sufficiently in quality after the Core Standards project to eliminate any 
differences in liquidity or information asymmetry that might have been observable 
prev iously. This would be consistent with standards having a frrst-order effect. The 
alternative interpretation, consistent with BRW, is that since the institutions are held 
relatively constant in this experiment but the standards vary at least to some degree, 
standards matter little and institutions matter a great deal. Unfortunately, the setting does 
not allow us to determine which of the two alternative explanations is correct. 
4. Qualitative vs. Quantitative Country Descriptions 
BRW's predictions about the four East Asian countries relative to code or 
common law countries are qualitative in nature. Their arguments are similar to the 
qualitative standard established in Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) (henceforth BKR). 
While there is nothing wrong with qualitative arguments, especially in new fields, it 
would have moved the literature a step forward if they had pushed harder on the 
measurement issues in this paper instead of adopting the standard of BKR. 
As an example of a more quantitative approach to characterizing countries' 
institutions, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), henceforth LNW, perform a cluster 
analysis on nine institutional variables discussed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998, 1999, 2000). These variables include features like investor rights, 
legal enforcement, outsider or insider economy, stock market size, etc. From their cluster 
analysis, LNW identify three different types of economies. The first is outsider 
economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights and 
strong legal enforcement (Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, UK, Norway, Canada, 
Australia and USA are in this cluster). The second is insider economies with less well-
developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak investor rights, but strong legal 
enforcement (Austria, Taiwan, Germany, Switzerland, France and Sweden are in this 
cluster). The third is similar to the insider economy described above, but with weak legal 
enforcement (Thailand, Greece, Korea, Spain and India are in this cluster). 
LNW then examine the extent to which earnings management is correlated with a 
country 's institutional characteristics. They find increasing earnings management as they 
move from cluster one to cluster three. Interestingly, consistent with BRW, they find 
more earnings management in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia than any other 
country in the first cluster. Thus, the results ofLNW lend some support to BRW's 
qualitative analysis. However, LNW's results also suggest that these four East Asian 
countries are not homogeneous, and that Thailand is different from the others. 
An approach like LNW seems like a reasonable quantitative start, though 
certainly not the only type of empirical analysis that could be conducted. In addition, if 
one were to adopt such an approach for the BRW paper, there may well be additional 
institutional features that need to be considered given the questions addressed by BRW. 
For example, a variable that captures the ownership structure issues discussed by BRW 
might be an important addition. 2 Such additional characteristics might separate Hong, 
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore from the other countries in the rrrst cluster or perhaps 
rank order the Asian countries on the extent to which we would expect earnings to be 
informative. 
My point is not that the qualitative arguments ofBRW are wrong, but since they 
are close in spirit to the types of arguments in BKR, it would be useful for the literature 
to begin to try to structure and quantify these differences using more quantitative 
measures and methodologies. Moreover, I am not suggesting that the approach used by 
LNW is the only approach that one could take. I 'm merely suggesting that BR W could 
have pushed harder to develop potentially more informative tests that have at least the 
potential to provide additional insights and structure. I note, that the literature as a whole 
appears to be moving in that direction. 
2 See Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) for a detailed discussion of the ownership structure and the 
separation of control and cash flow rights in East Asia. 
5. Are the Four Asian Countries Homogeneous? 
The authors, for the most part, treat the four Asian countries as being 
homogeneous, despite their discussions and the evidence of others that suggests these 
countries are not homogeneous. Table 3 of BRW contains the only test for significant 
differences across countries anywhere in the paper and it reports differences between 
groups of Asian, common and code countries. For both Asian and common countries, 
BRW show that earnings increases are less timely than for code countries, while loss 
recognition for the Asian countries is insignificantly different from code countries and 
both are less timely than losses for common countries. 
The central question here is why treat these countries homogeneously. BRW 
actually provide a rationale for why Thailand, at a minimum, should be treated differently 
from Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. Moreover, the cluster analysis ofLNW is 
consistent with at least classifying Thailand separately. Looking at BRW's figure 1, it is 
not obvious that these countries are homogeneous. Unfortunately, the authors provide no 
formal tests for whether the four Asian countries are significantly different from one 
another. 
To the extent the authors rely on R 2s of pooled country regressions (code, 
common and Asian), differences in the degree ofheterogeneity across countries will 
affect the regression R 2s, since all countries within a group are forced to have the same 
slope coefficients. Also implicitly, there is an assumption that the slope coefficients 
across firms within country are similar as well. If some countries have predominantly 
high- tech firms and some have predominantly low-tech firms, countries could experience 
different R 2s and slope coefficients simply because of the informativeness of earnings 
with respect to the mix of industries represented, even if the accounting standards and 
other institutions supporting the financial reporting process were identical across 
countries. BRW attempt to deal with the latter issue by including some industry dummy 
variables in the regression as a sensitivity analysis. 
6.0 Is Economic Income Measured with the Same Accuracy Across Countries? 
BRW's price tests assume that stock returns capture the same degree of ''true 
economic income" across countries. That is, since stock returns are BRW's measure of 
''true economic income", they are assuming that stock returns capture ' 'true economic 
income" equally well across countries using one-year windows. Moreover, they are 
assuming that good and bad news are reflected equally in stock returns within those one-
year windows. Thus, irrespective of the reporting environment, stock price returns are 
assumed to capture economic income equivalently across countries, an assumption that 
BRW discuss explicitly. 
BR W argue that insider know ledge would likely lead to the capture of equivalent 
economic income, even in places where the countries are essentially " insider economies" 
with limited disclosure requirements. But why do insiders in these "insider economies" 
have the same incentives to trade as a well-informed trader in a more market oriented 
economy? Do insiders have incentives to drive down stock prices in the face of bad news 
or increase stock prices in the face of good news if their equity positions are basically 
permanent? If these are family-owned businesses, how much trading should we expect 
to see and is that level of trading sufficient to incorporate insiders ' information? 
Moreover, insiders ' incentives to reveal good or bad information may shift through time 
ifthere are periods where they are raising or retiring outside capital. If insiders don' t 
have the same incentives to reveal good and bad news in their trading or through 
disclosure, biases might exist in the tests of timeliness and conservatism if stock returns 
don ' t reflect economic events equally quickly across countries or if good news and bad 
news are not reflected equally rapidly in stock returns. 
There is evidence to suggest that the informativeness of stock prices is not 
uniform across countries. Morek, Yeung and Yu (2000) show that synchronicity in stock 
returns is related to v ariables that measure government respect for private property and 
the extent of protection of public shareholders' property rights against corporate insiders. 
Lower synchronicity means that relativ ely more firm-specific information is capitalized 
into stock prices while higher synchronicity means that firm valuations are based 
relatively more on overall economic news. Morek, Yeung and Yu (2000) rank 40 
countries on the extent of the synchronicity in stock prices where a rank of one denotes 
the highest degree of synchronicity. Using two different measures of synchronicity, 
Malaysia ranks third (fourth), Thailand eighth (seventeenth), Singapore fifteenth 
(eleventh) and Hong Kong twenty-third (sixteenth). The United States ranks fortieth on 
both dimensions with many other common law countries ranking close to the United 
States. Thus, there is wide dispersion across countries in general and the four East Asian 
countries in particular, with respect to how much firm-specific information is capitalized 
into prices. The evidence on synchronicity is consistent with expecting the four East 
Asian Countries to exhibit R 2s and potentially slope coefficients that look more like code 
countries than common countries simply because of differences in the ability of stock 
returns to capture ''true economic income" . 3 
In discussing the impact of political costs on reported accounting numbers, BR W 
indicate that the Chinese are minorities in some of the East Asian countries, but represent 
many of the dominant family groups with substantive holdings. BRW argue that because 
the Chinese are subject to discrimination or potential discrimination in some of these 
countries, they do not want to disclose either extreme good or bad accounting 
performance because it is possible that the governments in those countries might choose 
to expropriate their wealth. BR W offer this as one explanation for why the link between 
economic and accounting income may be weak in the East Asian countries. But this 
argument seems incomplete because it focuses only on the manipulation of accounting 
income. If the Chinese-insider families are worried about wealth expropriation, would 
they buy shares in their corporations based on good news that only they knew, hence 
driving up the price because of their trades? If wealth expropriation is of concern, it 
would seem that they would be at least as concerned with managing the stock price, not 
just earnings, especially if their holdings are relatively permanent. If these insiders are 
not trading on their inside information, it is much less obv ious that stock prices measure 
''true economic income" with the same degree of precision across countries. 
To their credit, BR W do incorporate some non-price tests in the paper to allev iate 
concerns about the extent to which stock prices capture economic income equivalently 
across countries. Those results are consistent with the price-based tests and mitigate this 
3 The evidence in Morek, Yeung and Yu (2000) uses biweekly holding periods to measure synchronicity. 
So while informative, their research does not speak directly to the experimental design in BRW as BRW 
use annual return windows. Nevertheless, the evidence on synchronicity is certainly consistent with the 
notion that economic income, as defined by BRW, may not be measured identically across countries. 
concern. Nevertheless reliance on stock prices for examination of issues of this type is 
something that the literature should evaluate carefully. Evidence examining the extent to 
which stock prices reflect economic income equally across countries would be beneficial 
in trying to correctly specify tests in this area. In addition, reliance on non-price tests is 
potentially extremely useful and it would behoove us to understand more about the size 
and power ofthose types of tests. 
7. What is the extent of a timeliness and conservatism in a high quality financial 
reporting system? 
There is a degree of circularity in BRW's research design that gets introduced into 
their study because of the ' 'high quality" and "low quality" labels that appear in the paper. 
If the word quality did not appear in the paper, the paper would test whether institutional 
structures beyond accounting standards affect the characteristics of the fmancial reporting 
system. BRW would measure timeliness and conservatism (two measurable outcomes of 
the rmancial reporting system) and show that holding standards relatively constant (East 
Asian vs. Common in their view), we observe that timeliness and conservatism are 
different across institutional structures (East Asian vs. Common). 
So how does the use of the word quality affect their paper? First, they have to 
decide which countries have formal accounting standards which are high quality and 
which have low quality. This definition of quality seems to come from the commonly 
held belief among many writers in the international arena, that U.S., U.K. and lAS 
accounting standards (common-law influenced) are of high quality while many other 
standards (code-law influenced) are of low quality (Japan and Germany, at least 
historically). I have already questioned whether the lAS standards in the time period of 
the study are of sufficiently high quality, but this is not where the circularity in their 
study occurs. 
The circularity occurs from equating the timeliness and particularly the 
conservatism observed in the U.S. and other common-law countries with quality. 
Assume the authors ' premise, that other institutions beyond accounting standards affect 
timeliness and conservatism, is correct (which I believe it is). Then it is circular to judge 
the quality of financial reporting by the degree of timeliness and conservatism observed 
in common law countries. So even if we all agreed that U.S. GAAP was of the highest 
quality, judging the quality of other countries financial reporting regimes by a standard of 
U.S. timeliness and conservatism would not be warranted. 
BRW discuss why we expect to see conservatism in financial reporting (e.g., debt 
contracts, monitoring, litigation, etc.). Prior evidence is consistent with the litigation 
environment in the United States impacting the asymmetry in the recognition of gains 
and losses in the financial reporting process. Both Basu (1997) and Holthausen and 
Watts (200 1) find evidence consistent with the litigation environment affecting the extent 
of conservatism. But which is better, the extent of gain and loss recognition in the United 
States or in Hong Kong? BRW's results on Hong Kong look strikingly like Holthausen 
and Watts ' results for the United States pre 1983. 
The question is what level of conservatism is consistent with high quality 
fmancial reporting? It isn' t at all obvious that the degree of conservatism observed in the 
United States, Canada and Australia in the recent past implies a high quality financial 
reporting process, since the outcome in those countries is likely affected by the extensive 
litigation environment. Thus, it is not apparent that the degree of conservatism in the 
United States or other common law countries is an appropriate benchmark for quality. 
Moreover, it is likely that different users would prefer to see varying levels of 
conservatism within a country given their particular use of fmancial statements. 
Thus, the authors ' main premise may well be correct -- institutions can affect the 
attributes of the financial reporting process despite high quality accounting standards. 
However, there is circularity in attempting to determine whether lAS standards as applied 
in the four East Asian countries resulted in a " low quality outcome" (seep. 1 ofBRW), 
by comparing the timeliness and conservatism of the four East Asian countries to that 
observed in common law countries. Who is to say, or know, whether the observed 
common-law outcome is "high quality"? There is no theory of which I am aware that can 
equate quality with the degree of timeliness and conservatism observed in the United 
States and other common-law countries. 
Thus, I believe that the authors are on fairly "safe ground" with respect to 
investigating the relative impact of accounting standards and other features of the 
institutional structure on characteristics of the fmancial reporting process (in their case 
timeliness and conservatism), subject to the caveat that economic income may not be 
measured equivalently across countries. However, I think the introduction of the word 
"quality" in the paper leads to potential interpretation issues and introduces circularity 
into the paper. 
There is another related point that is worth making here. Certainly it is likely that 
fmancial reporting systems (standards, incentives, legal regimes, etc.) evolve to fit the 
economies they support. Perhaps those structures evolve too slowly, as some have 
indicated. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that this study does not speak to 
whether a particular reporting regime is appropriate for all countries (and the authors are 
careful not to make that claim). So even though the word quality is used in the paper, the 
authors do not claim that a high quality financial reporting process, as they defme it in 
terms of timeliness and conservatism, would be optimal for all economies. Howev er, my 
fear is that some readers may be confused on that point because ofthe introduction of the 
concept of quality in the paper. 
8.0 Summary and Future Work 
So in summary there are both positive and negativ e aspects of this paper. On the 
positive side, the topic is interesting. It is believ able and interesting that country-specific 
institutions beyond standards affect the characteristics of the financial reporting process, 
and I expect that future empirical work will be consistent with that premise. Thus the 
authors have certainly made a contribution, especially to the extent that some in the 
international arena have equated the quality of the financial reporting process with the 
quality of the formal standards alone. The authors hav e demonstrated the importance of 
considering the entire institutional structure on the financial reporting process. 
This issue is also important because it points to the difficulty of attempting to 
judge accounting standards through stock price studies, as those tests reflect both the 
accounting standards and the institutions of a country. In Holthausen and Watts (200 1), 
we critiqued the value relevance studies which attempt to shed light on the choice among 
alternative accounting standards by examining associations between stock prices and 
alternative accounting numbers. Among other critiques of that literature, we made the 
point that the observed associations are influenced by the institutional structure as well, 
so the outcome of that empirical work is not driven purely by accounting standards alone. 
Hence, those tests reflect more than the characteristics of accounting standards. 
On the negative side, there are interpretational difficulties associated with this 
study. While the authors provide ev idence consistent with the notion that standards alone 
do not determine the outcome of the financial reporting process, it is less clear that they 
have provided ev idence about whether "high quality" standards are a first-order effect or 
not, as there is uncertainty about whether the lAS standards are of high quality during this 
time period. 
Perhaps international comparisons are not the most powerful tests of the 
hypothesis that institutional structures beyond accounting standards affect the 
characteristics of financial reporting because there are so many things that are difficult to 
adequately control for in cross-country work. The trade-off of course, is that there are 
greater differences in institutional structures across countries. As an alternative, there 
may be within country changes in standards or institutions that would isolate certain 
effects better than a cross-country comparison. In this case, we may be able to hold more 
features ofthe ov erall reporting regime constant in the experiment than we can when 
making cross-country comparisons.4 To the extent we can find natural experiments 
where fewer things are changing, we may be able to get a handle on which institutions 
are more important determinants of the financial reporting process and whether 
accounting standards can substitute for some institutional features but not others . 
4 Leuz (2003), on the choice of lAS or US GAAP for New Market firms in Germany, is an example of a 
study that tries to hold the institutional arrangement constant and varies the accounting standards. 
Complicating the authors' quality interpretation is the question of what is the 
appropriate benchmark for high quality financial reporting. How much conservatism is 
too much and how quickly should economic gains and losses be recognized? Is the 
outcome of the fmancial reporting process in the United States a high quality one? Is it 
high quality to all constituencies? The answers to these questions are not readily 
apparent based on the timeliness and extent of asymmetry between gains and losses 
observed in the United States and in other common-law countries. While it is 
undoubtedly safe to say that the outcome of that financial reporting process responds to 
incentives, institutions and accounting standards, it is much more difficult to say what 
outcomes are high quality and what outcomes are low quality. 
With respect to future work, I would hope the literature evolves toward a more 
quantitative approach to classifying the countries. In the context of the current paper, I 
would have preferred to have seen tests of whether the Asian countries should be treated 
as a homogeneous group and, if that hypothesis were rejected, to use some empirically-
driven approach to classifying the East Asian countries. Those differences could then be 
used to develop potentially more powerful tests. 
To the extent that the literature continues to rely on stock prices to measure 
economic income, it is paramount that we document the extent to which stock returns 
capture "true economic income" equally across countries and the extent to which good 
and bad economic news is reflected equally quickly in stock returns across countries. We 
also need to better understand the power and size of non-price tests which might serve as 
useful substitutes for stock return tests. 
It is also likely to be productive to not treat firms homogenously within country. 
For example, to what extent can firms opt out of their country's reporting regime? If 
reporting regimes arise to balance all the forces in an economy, it is likely that a 
particular country' s financial reporting regime isn't equally optimal for all firms in a 
particular economy. For example, in an insider economy dominated by banks and large 
families, there will be some firms that will find it advantageous to raise capital from 
equity investors. Can they opt out of their reporting regime by cross-listing5, by hiring a 
high quality auditor6 or some other mechanism? If many firms in a given economy 
choose some mechanism to opt out of their country's normal financial reporting regime, 
then the results of tests like BRW will be a weighted average of all firms in the economy, 
those opting out and those not. 
This suggests that we may want to refine the types of tests that are conducted in 
some cross-country comparisons and allow for differences between firms within country. 
This is potentially important because it may be possible to undo or mitigate the effects of 
incentiv es and other forces, conditional on having adequate standards to begin with. If 
so, standards could still play a pivotal role in economies like those studied here, ev en if 
on average, the institutions don' t support them. As such, it would be premature to 
assume that adopting high quality standards could not lead to better outcomes for those 
firms which would like to opt out of a generally low quality reporting env ironment. 
5 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) show that non-U. S. firms listing in the U .S. have Tobin's q ratios that 
exceed that oftheirhome country counterparts by 16.5%. They argue that non-U .S. firms which list in the 
U .S. do so because the benefits to the controlling shareholders from being able to take advantage of their 
growth opportunities exceeds the loss from giving up their private control benefits. Thus, firms which 
choose to list in the U. S. have greater growth opportunities than those who do not. Hence, these firms opt 
out of their country's institutional structure, at least in part. 
6 Fan and Wong (2001) provide evidence that in eight East Asian countries where conventional corporate 
control mechanisms are not operativ e (the marl<:et for corporate control, independent boards, etc), that high 
quality auditors do provide a monitoring and bonding mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts. 
For example, perhaps a ftrm can opt out of a poor reporting regime by choosing a 
high quality auditor, conditional on there being high quality standards in place. But, if 
the standards are not of high quality, than perhaps hiring a high quality auditor cannot 
rectify the poor reporting regime. So standards could matter a great deal, but one might 
not see it in aggregate tests of the type conducted in BR W. Examining variation across 
ftrms might allow us to determine the extent to which accounting standards and other 
institutional features are complements or substitutes. 
The notion that ftrms can opt out of their country's institutional arrangements has 
implications for other work in this area. For example, apparent "improvements" in 
fmancial reporting as measured by metrics like timeliness and conservatism could be due 
more to ftrms opting out of their country's institutional arrangements than to changes in 
accounting standards or changes in a country ' s institutions. For example, if more of a 
country 's firms go to international capital markets (say, the U.S. capital markets) at the 
same time as that country adopts lAS, it might appear that l AS is affecting fmancial 
reporting. However, an equally plausible explanation might be that it is the act of opting 
out of the country's institutional structure that is the cause. This suggests that we should 
try to control for or eliminate ftrms that cross-list or which take other steps to mitigate the 
features of their institutional structure. 
Despite my specific critiques of this paper, I believe this is an interesting and 
provocative line of inquiry and an important issue for future research. Moreover, I 
believe that the BRW paper is an important part ofthis line of research. Readers are 
warned, however, to interpret the "quality" labels used by BRW with great care. 
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